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Abstract 
Soliciting and managing the protection of information assets has become a objective of 
paramount importance in an organizational context. Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) has the unique role of ensuring that adequate and appropriate security tools are in 
place in order to protect information assets. Security is always seen in three dimensions of 
technology, organization, and people. Undoubtedly, the socio-technical challenges have 
proven to be the most difficult ones to tackle. Social Engineering Attacks (SEAs) are a socio-
technical challenge and considerably increase security risks by seeking access to information 
assets by exploiting the vulnerabilities in organizations as they target human frailties. Dealing 
effectively and adequately with SEAs requires practical security benchmarking together with 
control mechanism tools, which in turn requires investment to support security and ultimately 
organizational goals. This paper contributes in this area. In particular, the paper proposes a 
language for managing SEAs using several concepts such as actor, risks, goals, security 
investment and vulnerabilities. The language supports in-depth investigation of human factors 
as one of the main causes of SEAs. It also assists in the selection of appropriate mechanisms 
considering security investment to mitigate risks. Finally, the paper uses a real incident in a 
financial institution to demonstrate the applicability of the approach.  
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Providing a strong security posture is crucial for business continuity. Currently with 
great threats of cyber attacks and virtual terrorism, security must be given adequate 
consideration. If they are not, everyday organizational activities will be grounded 
with real possibilities of loss, punitive financial fines and damaged reputation. SEAs 
undermine organizations’ efforts to deal with security in an effective way. There are 
several malicious practices such as Advanced Persistent Attack that create security 
breaches in organizations (Siponen et al. 2010). Janczewski and Fu (2010) defined 
the SEAs with two distinct methods; the “Human-Based and Technology-Based” 
attacks. However, the role of people and certain human factors are contributing 
greatly to SEAs. The attackers crack the security of an information system by 
exploitation of human weaknesses. SEAs increase risks of financial loss, legal fees 
and reputational loss for organizations. It is a challenging task for organizations to 
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deal with SEAs because they are human-oriented activities and human factors are 
difficult to deal with. This paper contributes to the link between the main human 
factors, which have been identified in previous study (Alavi et al. 2013) and SEAs 
with consideration of security investment. In particular, the paper proposes a 
language to analyze the attacks caused by human factors. This paper has adopted the 
Secure Tropos methodology to identify and analyze security concepts and extend it 
with these human factors and Security Investment (SI) so that appropriate 
justification can be taken into consideration in preventing such attacks (Mouratidis 
and Giorgini, 2004). Finally, the study considers a case study from a real security 
incident to demonstrate the applicability of the approach. 
2. Related Works 
There have been a number of works that focus on analyzing SEA attacks. This 
section includes the works that are relevant to the study’s approach.  Janczewski & 
Fu (2010) provided a conceptual model in order to understand SEAs impacts on 
individuals and businesses and present a defensive approach to mitigate these risks. 
The study focused on IT departments and a more abstract view of SEAs without 
considering SEAs concepts related to human factors and their relationships to the 
concept of SI. Greitzer et al (2014) looked at the insider threat that derives from 
SEAs. The study considered some related human factors but concentrated mainly on 
unintentional insider threats whilst observing psychological and social characteristic 
of people. Karpati et al (2012) used a comparison study between mal-activity 
diagram and misuse cases and presented two modeling techniques. This study 
attempted to provide a conceptual comparison in order to find the advantages and 
efficiency of each approach. It provided three main concepts; risk, asset-related and 
risk-treatment concepts. Although the paper concentrated on SEAs and provided a 
concrete discussion in the validity of the study, it did not embrace SI and actors such 
as human and security systems. In addition, the paper distinguished between 
information security assets and business assets, which can potentially be a confusing 
issue when it comes to SI. Some other studies concentrated on specific attacks such 
as phishing attacks (Finn & Jakobsson 2005) or advanced persistent attacks 
(Shakarian et al 2013).  
All the above-mentioned works contribute towards investigating SEAs.  However, 
none of these works explicitly focus on human factors, which are one of the main 
reasons for SEAs. In particular, SEAs require a systematic approach to analyze the 
complex human factors and solutions in order to address any issues relating to them. 
Security markets are dominated with technical solutions promising much in security 
efficiency whilst brushing aside human elements despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary. This work contributes in analyzing human factors and proposes 
solutions and security investment in these solutions so that an organization can make 
the right decision relating to information security.      
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3. Social Engineering  
3.1. Social Engineering Attack 
Social engineering is the act of manipulating a person to take an action that may            
or may not be in the target’s best interest which include obtaining information, 
gaining access or getting the target to take a certain action (Hadnagy and Wilson, 
2010). Responding to the threats of SEAs using technological resources and tools 
would not be enough to deal with the associated risks because people are at the 
centre of such attacks and they play a vital role in it. Organizations may use various 
tools such as web server security to detect and minimize SEAs but they have 
difficulty in preventing and responding to human actions and behavior in socially 
engineered incidences. SEAs resulted mainly in the exploitation of many related 
issues of human factors. There are specific factors, which were identified, in the 
previous study and play important roles in such attacks (Alavi et al., 2013): Lack of 
awareness and ample set of skills, inadequate communication skills, Lack of 
supervision and sufficient involvement of management. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that human factors and human social interactions can be engineered for 
exploitation in gaining access to an organization’s assets. The lack of, or an 
inadequate control mechanism leaves human factors open to exploitation. Attackers 
generally use different deceptive methods to exploit users who have a lack of 
awareness about the system and its surrounding context. 
3.2. Reasons for Social Engineering Attacks 
Human factors remain essential to any SEAs because no matter how many training 
programs or control mechanisms are deployed; people are the weakest link in 
security (Hadnagy 2011). SEAs can cause a great deal of disruption to everyday 
business activities and create financial, social and technical mayhem in which the 
impacts may go beyond geographical borders and organizational boundaries. 
Therefore, dealing with SEAs would be in the best interest of any organization. 
According to the (Verizon 2014) report, human factors are the main sources of 
SEAs. People can be easily socially engineered which leads to compromise of 
information systems in organizations. Even when attackers use complex and 
sophisticated technical hacking methods they would consider using people as a main 
tool in delivering their malicious software. For example they use e-mail attachments, 
which can easily mislead people and deliver the payloads of malicious program in 
order to gain access to a system. This type of attack is just one example out of 
hundreds of methods, which has worked both with big organizations and central 
governments. Janczewski and Fu (2010) identified five main causes of SEAs, i.e., 
people, lack of security awareness, psychological weaknesses, technology, and 
defenses and attack methods. 
3.3. Social Engineering Attacks Taxonomies 
There are certain concepts which must be considered to provide adequate defense 
mechanism against SEAs either detective or preventive. These include the style of 
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attacks with consideration of human factors, the expected result of attacks and the 
possible impacts. This study developed SEA taxonomy in order to identify the main 
concepts and their attributes of the proposed language. Figure 1 shows how an 
attacker can plan an attack, which has variable impacts such as disclosure of data and 
theft of resources. The impact/s fulfils the goals and objectives of the attacker 
whether financial, personal, or political gain.  
 
Figure 1: Social Engineering Attack Taxonomy 
4. Language for Managing Social Engineering Attacks 
4.1. Framing concepts 
The process of securing information has become more critical than ever. When 
security is mission-critical and tied to revenue chains and compliance, then it has 
significant bottom-line impact. Security, cannot tolerate any performance delays by 
protection mechanisms, and require extra attention to ensure its success and at the 
lowest possible cost. Most research has concentrated on the success of security 
without consideration to cost that has an impact on the overall Return on Information 
Security Investment (ROISI). However, both security concepts of ISMS process and 
cost concepts of ROISI process have the same goal which includes the protection of 
information assets to prevent extra cost as a result of financial and reputational 
losses. Adopting a combined framework would enable us to address both security 
and investment concepts. The novelty of this work is a language that combines the 
concepts from security, risks and investment to support defense mechanism against 
SEAs and to assist in the calculation of return of SI considering human factors. The 
paper adopted Security Tropos to analyze security concepts such as actor, security 
goal, vulnerability, threat and plan and extended it with risks and SI from which 
ROISI can then be appropriately calculated in future study (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 
2004). These concepts equip security architecture to establish the security-investment 
relationship and the systematically reasoning of them. This section lays out an 
overview of the concepts used in the Metamodel. 
Actor: is the central concept of the proposed language. It represents an entity that 
has strategic goals and intentions within a system and organizational settings. An 
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actor in this case can be human or the ISMS. In particular, human actor includes 
several factors such as awareness, communication and the involvement of 
management. ISMS actor has properties such as security policy and physical 
security.  
Goal: is a stakeholder (Actor) objective or strategic interest for a system and its 
surrounding environment. The strategic objective of actor is to achieve goal and does 
not care how it is achieved but goal satisfaction should be formulated in agreement 
of shared development amongst all actors. The proposed language differentiates 
between security and organizational goals. Organizational goals represent goals that 
are important at an organizational level. Such goals include profitability, compliance, 
continuity, reputation and performance. Security goals support security needs. This 
means a secure goal serves actors’ and concerns associated with goal (Giorgini et al, 
2006). Confidentiality, integrity, availability, auditability and authenticity are the 
security goals. An adequate security balance can be obtained by exchanging security 
requirements and other functional/non-functional requirements of the security system 
that is equipped according to the goal.   
Risk: Risk is the potential damage of consequence of a security incident. The 
incident arises from information process in organizations that may be maliciously 
exploited. SEA is an example of such exploitation. Risk is present in every aspect of 
information process and poses a possible loss within an organization. The proposed 
language has three different types of risks including; financial loss: A risk, which is 
difficult to quantify. However, this risk can be a direct loss of financial accounts or a 
loss as a result of disruption of business. Legal fines: A risk of organizations in 
receiving a fine as result of a security incident which violates legal obligations. 
Reputational loss: This is a risk, which traditionally was a result of reporting to the 
regulator. The risk of reputational loss could be the loss of attracting new customers 
and in some cases could affect credit rating.   
Security incident: In the proposed language SEAs create threats that are caused by 
actors using different types (Figure 1). The possible threats can be: Internal system 
compromise, stolen customer data, phony transaction, insider attack and DoS attacks.    
Vulnerabilities: A weakness in ISMS procedures, design, implementation, or 
internal controls that could be exercised and result in a security breach. Despite being 
patched by control mechanism a system always has vulnerabilities. This concept can 
be addressed by the vulnerability assessment which provides guidelines for 
protection mechanism. It consists of defining and classifying system resources, 
assigning levels of importance to the resources, identifying potential threats to each 
individual resource, developing countermeasure strategy and implementing methods 
to minimize the consequences of SEAs.  
Security investment (SI): the concept of SI is defined as the capital that is being 
made available for security solutions via protection mechanism in supporting a goal.  
SI in this case is not a direct measure of the profit but prevents or at least, lessens the 
loss that could occur from human related security incidents. Therefore SI should 
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consider technical and non-technical cost implications. The reason for this is that the 
cost of preventive measures of SEAs is varied whilst the landscape of threats and 
consequently the risks are changing. At the same time other attributes require 
attention. They can be business impact analysis (BIA), threat description, 
vulnerability assessment, risk evaluation and treatment.  
Plan: is a workable long-term (strategic) mid-term (tactical) and short-term 
(operational), actions for reasoning and achieving goal must be utilized and 
adoptable for actors. Protect mechanism requires a plan to achieve ISMS security 
and organizational goals by ensuring strategic security and SI improvements. Long-
term strategy entails issues related to human factors portfolio (involvement of senior 
management) and risk analysis. Mid-term (tactical) plan also concerns a human 
factors portfolio (awareness and communication) and tactical improvements such as 
maintenance and communication. The short-term (operational) phase of the plan is 
about allocation of critical IT assets, human factors portfolio and security 
implementation practice. 
Protect mechanism: is the real control for addressing strategy and supporting plan. 
It can be detective or preventive for SEAs. It also protects information assets and 
assists patch system vulnerabilities. They can be either technical or non-technical and 
are listed as part of SI.  
The goal, actor and plan used and defined is based on the entities of Secure Tropos. 
The security-risk language and other related concepts are adopted from ISMS 
principles whilst SEA incidents are defined based on wider SE concepts. The SI 
relies on ROISI process that was briefly explained earlier and will be followed by 
future study. Figure 2 presents the Metamodel, which is the combination of the 
above concepts, linked with some of the Secure Tropos security concepts.  
 
Figure 2: Proposed Metamodel 
This paper approaches the concepts of security incidents, SI and humans as actor all 
play a major role whilst the protect mechanism is the core concept. Protect 
mechanism relies on strategic planning in providing detective and preventive 
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methods for security incidents. It assists patching vulnerabilities and assets 
protection, which are mainly information (soft) assets. Once SI is configured, then 
detective and preventive control mechanism could potentially mitigate financial, 
reputational and legal risks. The mid and long-term plan strategy also supports 
protect mechanism in addressing awareness, communication and management 
support of actor (human) entities. Actor has vulnerabilities which can be exploited 
and influence security incidents. The identified detective and preventive controls 
create a set of consequences in the system. The consequences require validating 
against security incidents and SI to establish the leverage of the incident and actor in 
the system. If this is not justified then protect mechanism must be equipped to 
replace the gap requirements of planning and investment.  
5.  Case study 
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach, the paper deployed the 
proposed language through a case study scenario. The following description is a real 
and successful SEA incident that happened in a financial institution within the UK. 
This incident was an isolated but, successful case and the organization did not 
publicize it. One of the authors of this study had access to the incident log and 
therefore the company’s name cannot be revealed.   
Scenario  
An employee received an email from one of the managers’ referencing an invoice 
hosted on a cloud file sharing service. A few minutes later, the same employee 
received a phone call from another manager within the organization, instructing her 
to examine and process the invoice. However, the invoice was a fake and the 
manager who called the employee was an attacker. The apparent invoice was in fact 
a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that was designed to contact and command-and-
control (C&C) the server. By using the RAT, the attacker took control of the 
employee’s computer instantly. The attacker managed to breach a part of the server 
as the multi-layered encrypted server prevented him from getting access to all the 
servers. This attacker used a socially engineered attack for financial gain. Before the 
attack was stopped they succeeded in getting a financial incentive in the region of 
£50,000.00.  
Actors:  The main actors involved in the scenario are: 
x Employee: The employee here is the target victim. She was exposed with 
malicious pretexting and an identity theft by the attacker. She was a victim 
of a malicious and successful pretexting method. 
x Employee Manager: The scenario also includes a victim target whom was 
a manager as an employee of the organization. The manager was a victim of 
impersonation. The attacker used the victim’s defined organizational 
authority.  
x Attacker: The attacker was an ex-contractor who previously carried out 
some network maintenance and had some insider knowledge from the target 
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company. However, the attacker needed to elicit his knowledge so he used 
various sources such as, the organization’s web site and social media for 
this purpose. The attacker implemented some SE techniques in order to be 
confident enough to run the attack. He exploited various weaknesses of the 
target victims, such as lack of authentication in the communication process 
and the skill of the target employee. The attacker manipulated the employee 
to behave in certain ways in order that the attacker accomplished his goal, 
which was to access financial data for financial gain.  
x ISMS: is a target system and provides security policy and physical security 
to ensure security is sound. The nature of this attack reveals that an 
employee is easily tricked. Something which security policy should re-
adjust itself to. The re-training program lacks adequate phone calls and E-
mail authentications’ procedures.  
Goals: The following goals have been observed:  
x Financial gain:  The attacker’s goal is to obtain financial information in 
order to gain financial reward. 
x Perform duty: The victim employee’s goal is to perform their duty and 
follow the ISMS practice of the organization. In addition, the target victim 
employee’s desire is to protect her employment contract that can be in line 
for review because it has been breached.  
x Organization goal: the victim target organization requires continuity, 
performance and profitability needs to be maintained whilst the reputation 
and its compliance objectives are preserved.   
 
Security Incident:  The incident was mainly exploited by a phishing attack in which 
the attacker impersonated one of the managers.  The main reason the attack was 
successful was because the employee followed the existing ISMS practice but the 
authentication process was not adequate in identification checks over the phone.  
Vulnerabilities: The attacker mostly followed different elicitation methods to 
consolidate information before making the attack. The main weakness was the lack 
of an authorization mechanism for phone call verification.   
Risk: The incident posed several possible risks in context. 
x Financial loss: Attacker successfully obtained financial gain which is 
estimated at £50,000.00,  
x Classified data leakage:  There was a specific data related invoice that 
helped the attacker exploit the attack. This means that there was a violation 
of the Data Protection Act by the organization.  
Plan: In this scenario the lack of improvements in the three stages of planning 
including long, medium and short-term is clear. The human factors portfolio raises 
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major concerns whilst some technical improvements in authentication of 
communication seems necessary.  
Protect mechanism: The study observed following protection mechanism for 
mitigating root causes of the incident so that the chance of success of such attacks 
can be minimized in future. Therefore, if the control mechanism was adequate 
enough to detect socially engineered activities then the attack could have been 
detected and dealt with adequately. This could have been done through a detailed 
training program as a soft control measure. A hard (technical) measure could have 
been established for the authentication of phone communication where such requests 
in accessing sensitive data require a password. This helps to establish an 
authenticated communication channel. This mechanism requires investment in 
updating security policy and providing new training reminders that seeks 
management support. Because the attacker was an ex-contractor, a review of access 
control measures is required to ensure unauthorized access is denied to the use of out 
dated credentials.    
Security Investment (SI): intends to identify the investment that organizations 
require in order to deal with all security incidents effectively and adequately. The 
following questions could help in reaching the right decision of the executive 
management team: What obligations is the organization bound by in terms of 
compliance? What sanctions in information management in this scenario have been 
hit? Does the organization feel over-retention is a concern or is a necessary price to 
pay for compliance? Future study should look at the quantification of ROISI to 
response to the above questions. As far as this study is concerned, investment could 
more than cover the loss involved in an incident and is the main part of the proposed 
language. For the purpose of this study, the paper introduced the preliminary 
expected cost to cover the loss arising from incidents from the following parameters: 
External Services Cost ES(C), Purchasing Cost P(C), Employee Cost E(C), 
Administrative Cost A(C), Legal Costs L(C). Therefore the total expected cost of 
new and updating control mechanism would be: TEC(T) =ES(C) + P(C) + E(C) + 
A(C) + L(C). Future study should look at other parameters of investment concepts 
such as, Single Expected Attack Loss, Insurance Claim, Revenue Loss (from 
existing/potential clients) and Average Margin.  
6. Discussion 
The paper presents a SEAs risks-based language considering human factors and 
security investment. It includes several concepts such as goal, actor, SI, incident, 
risk, and protection mechanism that allow the analysis of SEA incidents and 
proposes appropriate control in a structured manner. The main reason for the 
discussed incident was because of the way in which employees were deceived with 
infected E-mail and hoax phone calls. This timely work contributes in addressing the 
challenge of managing human factors and security investment, so that possible risks 
can be mitigated. The study demonstrates the concepts through case study. This 
paper’s observation is that the organization’s current protection mechanism lack 
consistency. There are two important issues that have not been considered. Firstly 
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there is the nature of attacks in which employees are easily tricked. Secondly that 
controls are needed by the application of patching. Employees are required to be 
trained in dealing with email and phone authentication processes, to distinguish 
between genuine and invalid hoax communications. Without knowing how much 
organizations would get in return from extra and new investment, it is a little like 
walking blind folded along a path. The concepts of language support analyzing the 
factors with realistic proposed solutions to control SEA based on SI. CISOs in 
organizations are the main beneficiary of this language in addressing security policy 
and security related human factors. There are certain limitations in this study. 
However the most important consideration is the nature of a business as well as the 
differences in organizational, culture and risk appetite.   
7. Conclusions 
With the rapid grown of information technology and the subsequent rise of an 
information society, the cost of information security and consequently the return of 
any investments in this area become one of the major concerns of organizations and 
governments. The objective of this work is to present a language that provides an 
understanding in the relationship between various concepts involved in SEA 
incidents considering human factors. These concepts systematically support 
analyzing SEAs and identifying appropriate mechanisms and investment for a 
mechanism to protect SEAs. The study then illustrated the use of this language in a 
real-life circumstance within a case study. The ROISI process which will be 
developed in future study will provide a valuation of annual expectancy in loss and 
SI. To develop a model from this language further research is required.  
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